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SYMPOSIUM: 50 YEARS WITH THE 25TH AMENDMENT 
THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT: ITS CRAFTING AND 
DRAFTING PROCESS 
John D. Feerick* 
In previous writings, dating back to 1963, I detailed the extensive 
legislative history of the Twenty-fifth Amendment.1 This undertaking, 
because of the enormous current interest in the amendment, provides a 
brief guide to that history. When the amendment was proposed for 
ratification on July 6, 1965, it culminated a 10-year period of study by 
Congress and the Justice Department of how to deal with the problem of 
presidential inability. It answered one of the two questions asked at the 
Constitutional Convention of 1787 by John Dickinson of Delaware, who 
reflected that the provision on presidential succession was “too vague.” 
“What is the extent of the term ‘disability,’” he inquired, and “Who is to 
be the judge of it?”2 He received no responses. The final succession 
provision in Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 of the Constitution provides: 
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or his Death, 
Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said 
Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress 
may by law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or 
Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what 
Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act 
 
* Norris Professor of Law and Dean Emeritus, Fordham University School of Law. I acknowledge 
with gratitude the editing and footnoting assistance of John Rogan, Esq., Leo Korman of the Fordham 
Law School Class of 2019, and Clementine Schillings. 
 1.  See JOHN D. FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS: THE STORY OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 
(1965); JOHN D. FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT: ITS COMPLETE HISTORY AND 
APPLICATIONS (3d ed. 2014); John D. Feerick, The Problem of Presidential Inability—Will Congress 
Ever Solve It?, 32 FORDHAM L. REV. 73 (1963); John D. Feerick, The Proposed Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment To the Constitution, 34 FORDHAM L. REV. 173 (1965); John D. Feerick, Presidential 
Succession and Inability: Before and After the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 907 
(2010); John D. Feerick, The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: A Personal Remembrance, 86 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1075 (2017). 
 2.  See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 427 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). 
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accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be 
elected.3 
In 1841, upon the death of President William Harrison, Vice 
President John Tyler asserted that he became President under this 
provision for the rest of Harrison’s term. He thereby created a precedent 
that would haunt the country when an assassin’s bullet left President 
James Garfield hovering between life and death for 80 days in 18814 and 
when a stroke disabled President Woodrow Wilson in 1919.5 The status 
of a Vice President in cases of inability and the issue of who determines 
its existence and termination came into focus as subjects for legal reform, 
with many different points of view expressed by scholars, legislators, 
academic leaders, and lawyers as to the form of such reform.6 The 
evolution of a more dangerous world requiring presidential leadership at 
all times kept the idea of reform alive and on the agendas of the House 
and Senate Judiciary Committees. 
In September 1955, House Judiciary Committee Chairman Emanuel 
Celler of New York asked the committee’s staff to study the subject. They 
developed and distributed a questionnaire to historians, political scientists, 
law professors and others, asking questions such as: What is the meaning 
of “inability”?7 Should Congress enact a definition of inability into law?8 
Who should initiate the question of inability and determine it? Who 
should determine the end of a temporary inability?9 In the event of a 
temporary inability, should the Vice President succeed to the discharge of 
the powers and duties of President or to the office of President itself, as 
Tyler did for the rest of Harrison’s term?10 Does Congress have the 
authority to enact legislation to resolve any or all of these questions, or is 
a constitutional amendment necessary?11 
Following this initiative, in the face of three disabilities of President 
Eisenhower, proposals were advanced as to how a President’s inability 
 
 3.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6. 
 4.  FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 1, at 8-10; see generally CANDICE 
MILLARD, DESTINY OF THE REPUBLIC: A TALE OF MADNESS MEDICINE AND THE MURDER OF A 
PRESIDENT (2011). 
 5.  FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 1, at 14-16. 
 6.  See FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS, supra note 1, at 133-135. 
 7.  Staff of H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 84th Cong., PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY: ANALYSIS OF 
REPLIES TO A QUESTIONNAIRE AND TESTIMONY AT A HEARING ON PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY 1 
(Comm. Print 1957). 
 8.  Id. at 4. 
 9.  Id. at 11, 20, 37. 
 10.  Id. at 49. 
 11.  Id. at 58. See FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 1, at 50-51. 
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might be determined.12 General agreement manifested itself that a 
constitutional amendment should codify the Tyler precedent for cases of 
death, resignation, and removal and provide for an Acting President in 
cases of inability. But there was considerable disagreement over how to 
determine the beginning and end of an inability.13 Strong leadership in 
dealing with these questions was given by the Attorneys General of the 
United States, first Herbert Brownell and then William Rogers, and by a 
number of members of Congress, including Representative Celler and 
Senators Kenneth Keating of New York and Estes Kefauver of Tennessee. 
The Eisenhower Administration’s early proposal contemplated a 
constitutional amendment under which the President could declare his 
own inability in writing. The Vice President would then discharge the 
powers and duties of the office of President as Acting President. If the 
President were unable to declare his own inability, the Vice President, “if 
satisfied of the President’s inability, and upon approval by a majority of 
the heads of the executive departments, who are members of the 
President’s Cabinet,” would serve as Acting President. The President 
would resume his powers and duties upon his written declaration of 
recovery.14 
As subsequently modified, the proposal provided that when the 
President declared his inability had ended he would not resume his powers 
and duties for seven days unless he and the Vice President agreed to an 
earlier resumption. If the Vice President, with the approval of a majority 
of the heads of the executive departments, disagreed with the President’s 
declaration, he could bring before Congress the disagreement as to his 
recovery. If a majority of the House voted that the President was disabled 
and the Senate concurred by a two-thirds vote, the Vice President would 
then discharge the powers and duties of President until the Vice President 
declared an end of the inability or a majority of both Houses of Congress 
decided that the inability had ended.15 
Despite the attention given to the subject, including approval of this 
modified proposal by the Senate Judiciary’s Subcommittee in 1958, 
neither House of Congress took action. There was not sufficient 
 
 12.  See Joel K. Goldstein, Taking From the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Lessons in Ensuring 
Presidential Continuity, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 959, 964 (2010). 
 13.  FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 1, at 53. 
 14.  Id. at 51 (Under this proposal, the question of a President’s inability could be raised by 
either the Vice President or a majority of the heads of the executive departments.). 
 15.  See Hearings on Presidential Inability Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional 
Amendments of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong. 1-2 (1958); FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH 
AMENDMENT, supra note 1, at 52-53.  
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agreement on the procedure for determining an inability and its 
termination to advance any proposal for floor debate.16 
In the meantime, President Eisenhower developed a protocol with 
Vice President Richard Nixon for handling another inability that might 
occur during his term.17 It provided that the President could transfer his 
powers and duties to the Vice President as Acting President and that if the 
President could not communicate his inability, the Vice President would 
decide upon the devolution of the President’s powers, with such 
consultation as he thought appropriate.18 In either case, the President 
would determine when the inability had ended and upon that 
determination resume his powers and duties.19 Presidents John Kennedy 
and Lyndon Johnson continued this protocol, in Johnson’s case with 
Speaker John McCormack.20 
Despite these protocols, efforts in Congress to find a permanent 
solution continued. By June 1963, Senators Kefauver and Keating, putting 
aside their different approaches,21 agreed on a proposed constitutional 
amendment that would clarify the status of a Vice President in a case of 
inability and grant Congress the power to determine the method for the 
commencement and termination of any inability.22 Said Keating: 
Senator Kefauver and I . . . agreed that if anything was going to be done, 
all of the detailed procedures which had been productive of delay and 
controversy had best be scrapped for the time being in favor of merely 
authorizing Congress in a constitutional amendment to deal with 
particular methods by ordinary legislation. This, we agreed, would later 
allow Congress to pick and choose the best form among all the proposals 
 
 16.  FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 1, at 53. 
 17.  See Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law’s Clinic on Presidential Succession, Report, Ensuring the 
Stability of Presidential Succession in the Modern Era, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 77-79 (2012) 
[hereinafter Fordham Clinic Report]. 
 18.  Id. at 79. 
 19.  Id. at 79.  
 20.  Id. at 79-80. 
 21.  While a member of the House of Representatives in 1956, Keating proposed a ten-member 
commission to judge presidential inability by majority vote.  The commission would have consisted 
of the Vice President as a nonvoting member, the Chief Justice, the senior Associate Justice, the 
Speaker and minority leader of the House, the majority and minority leaders of the Senate, the 
Attorney General, and the Secretaries of State and of the Treasury. In 1958, the Senate Subcommittee 
on Constitutional Amendments, which Kefauver chaired, approved a proposed amendment that would 
have allowed the Vice President and majority of the Cabinet to declare the President unable. FEERICK, 
TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 1 at 51-53. 
 22.  See S.J. Res. 35, 88th Cong. (1963) (as reported by Subcomm. on Constitutional 
Amendments, June 11, 18, 1963). 
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without suffering the handicap of having to rally a two-thirds majority 
in each House to do it.23 
The Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments 
approved this approach, embodied in S. J. Res. 35, on June 25, 1963, with 
the operative language being: “The commencement and termination of 
any inability shall be determined by such method as Congress by law 
provided.” The death of Senator Kefauver in August 1963 brought this 
momentum to a halt.24 
The assassination of President Kennedy in November 1963 revived 
the subject as media accounts speculated as to the handling of his inability 
had he not died but was left wounded and disabled.25 The new chair of the 
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, Birch 
Bayh of Indiana, and Emanuel Celler immediately took leadership steps 
to address the subject. Senator Bayh drafted a proposed constitutional 
amendment, S.J. Res 139, with concepts present in the inability proposals 
of the Eisenhower Administration plus provisions for filling a vacancy in 
the vice presidency and changing the statutory line of succession.26 He 
shared his views with an American Bar Association conference committee 
of 12 lawyers,27 which I was invited to join because of a recent article I 
had written on the subject of presidential inability.28 
After its meeting on January 20 and 21, 1964, the ABA’s conference 
committee adopted as its recommendations the concepts that were 
expressed in S.J. Res 139 and included in its recommendations a number 
of additions.29 These included a provision for a joint session of Congress 
in filling of a vice presidential vacancy. It suggested a provision providing 
for the person next in line of succession to act as Vice President under the 
amendment if the office of Vice President were vacant. The Committee 
also suggested a provision empowering Congress to substitute another 
body to act with the Vice President if the heads of the executive 
departments proved unworkable.30 These recommendations were not 
written in statutory language but rather were set forth in an ABA press 
 
 23.  FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 1 at 54-55. 
 24.  Id. at 55. 
 25.  Arthur Krock, Kennedy’s Death Points Up Orderly Progression in U.S. Government, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 24, 1963, E9. 
 26.  See S.J. Res. 139, 88th Cong. (1st Sess. 1963). 
 27.  See BIRCH BAYH, ONE HEARTBEAT AWAY: PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND SUCCESSION 
45-50 (1968). 
 28.  See Feerick, Personal Remembrance, supra note 1, at 1078-79. 
 29.  BAYH, ONE HEARTBEAT AWAY, supra note 27, at 49-50. 
 30.  See id. at 349. 
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release describing the consensus of the conference. Point 3 of the 
Consensus said: 
The amendment should provide that in the event of inability of the 
President the powers and duties, but not the office, shall devolve upon 
the Vice President or person next in line of succession for the duration 
of the inability of the President or until expiration of his term in office.31 
Point 4 said: 
The amendment should provide that the inability of President may be 
established by declaration in writing of the President. In the event the 
President does not make known his inability, it may be established by 
action of the Vice President or person next in line of succession with the 
concurrence of a majority of the Cabinet or by action of such other body 
as the Congress may by law provide.32 
As to presidential succession the ABA release stated: “The Constitution 
should be amended to provide that in the event of the death, resignation 
or removal of the President, the Vice President or the person next in line 
of succession shall succeed to the office for the unexpired term.”33 
The consensus recommendations were approved by the ABA House 
of Delegates on February 17, 1964, and then presented to the 
Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments by the President and 
President-elect of the ABA.34 Following these hearings, the Senate 
Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments amended S.J. Res. 139 to 
include, among other provisions, the “such other body” provision of the 
ABA consensus and the consensus language calling for a “concurrence” 
by a majority of the heads of the executive departments with respect to 
any action taken by the Vice President under Section 4.35 Not accepted by 
the subcommittee from the ABA consensus was the provision that would 
devolve the powers and duties of the President on the person next in line 
of succession if there were no Vice President or the provision for holding 
a joint session of Congress to fill a vacancy in the Vice Presidency.36 
The committee dropped the requirement in the original version of 
S.J. Res. 139 that the President nominate a replacement Vice President 
 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 1, at 58. 
 35.  See id. at 71-74. The committee also codified the Tyler Precedent that the Vice President 
becomes (for the rest of the term) President in the case of death, resignation, or removal of President. 
The committee dropped from this provision reference to serving “for the rest of the President’s 
unexpired term,” considering it unnecessary. See id. at 71-72. 
 36.  See id. at 74-75. 
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within 30 days. However, the committee made this change with the 
expectation that the President would make a vice presidential nomination 
within a reasonable time. Also dropped were the provisions in S.J. Res. 
139 for a Cabinet line of succession given that the provision for filling a 
vice presidential vacancy made it less likely that the statutory line of 
succession would be reached. As for a President who declares his own 
inability, there was no provision as to whom the declaration should be sent 
and no provision allowing the President immediately to resume his powers 
and duties upon his declaration of recovery. As for a provision devolving 
power on the person next in the statutory line of succession, as suggested 
by the ABA consensus, the Subcommittee thought it unnecessary, and it 
did not choose to deal with a vice presidential inability.37 The more issues 
that were dealt with, the subcommittee believed, the more likely they 
would become a detriment to favorable action on the basic proposal of 
dealing with the major gaps surrounding a presidential inability. 
The Subcommittee also added detail to what eventually became 
Section 4 of the amendment, then expressed in two sections of S. J. Res. 
139, sections 4 and 5. These sections dealt with an involuntary declaration 
of inability and provided for a two-day wait period before the President 
could resume his powers and duties in order that the President’s 
declaration of recovery could be considered by the Vice President and the 
heads of the executive departments. If they disagreed with the President, 
Congress would have to “immediately decide” the issue, with the Vice 
President continuing to serve until Congress decided the issue. The 
President would resume his powers and duties unless two thirds of each 
House of Congress sided with the Vice President and the heads of the 
executive departments. These recovery provisions operated irrespective 
of whether the inability declaration was voluntary or involuntary.38 Final 
action in the Senate on the Judiciary’s committee report in support of S.J. 
Res 139 occurred on September 29, 1964, when the Senate approved it, 
65 to 0.39 
In January 1965, S.J. Res. 139, as approved on September 29th, was 
introduced in the new Congress as S.J. Res 1 in the Senate and as H. R. J. 
Res. 1 in the House, popularly known as the Bayh-Celler amendment.40 
President Johnson embraced its approach in a special message to Congress 
on January 28, 1965, in which he stated, 
 
 37.  See id. at 71-75. 
 38.  See id. at 72-73. 
 39.  See 110 CONG. REC. 23,061 (1964). 
 40.  FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 1, at 79-80. 
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Favorable action by the Congress on the measures here recommended 
will, I believe, assure the orderly continuity in the Presidency that is 
imperative to the success and stability of our system. Action on these 
measures now will allay future anxiety among our own people, and 
among peoples of the world, in the event senseless tragedy or 
unforeseeable disability should strike again at either or both of the 
principal Offices of our constitutional system. If we act now, without 
undue delay, we shall have moved closer to achieving perfection of the 
great constitutional document on which the strength and success of our 
system have rested for nearly two centuries.41 
A year earlier, former President Dwight Eisenhower, who also 
embraced the Bayh-Celler approach, had expressed similar comments at 
an ABA forum: 
I believe that we can solve this thing, not next year, or in two or three 
years, but now. I do not believe that it’s quite as intricate as we make it. 
But it does mean . . . that we do believe that all of us, of all parties and 
of all levels of government, have as our first thought and concern, the 
United States of America.42 
In throwing his support behind the proposal, Eisenhower also warned 
that no statute or constitutional amendment could account for all 
contingencies. Instead, the nation had to put faith in the people responding 
to a future crisis. He said it was important to assume that those people 
would be “men of honor, men of integrity, men whose concern is the 
welfare of their own country and not of their own personal ambitions.”43 
In February 1965, S.J. Res. 1 was reported out favorably by the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, but with amendments.44 Among the 
amendments was the specification in Section 3 of a requirement that a 
declaration of inability by the President be sent to the Speaker of the 
House and the President of the Senate. Similarly, the sections of the 
proposals dealing with an involuntary determination of inability by the 
President were also amended to identify the Speaker of the House and the 
President of the Senate as the recipients of the declarations instead of just 
“Congress” as in the then versions of S.J. Res. 139 and S. J. Res. 1. It was 
assumed that if out of session, the presiding officers of Congress would 
 
 41.  Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of Vice President: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 14 
(1965). 
 42.  BAYH, ONE HEARTBEAT AWAY, supra note 27, at 123. 
 43.  See id. 
 44.  See S. REP. NO. 89-66 (1965). 
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have the power to convene a special session, but there was no provision 
in the proposed amendment on that subject.45 
Another amendment made by the Committee was to change the 
expression in S. J. Res. 1 of “heads of the executive departments” to 
“principal officers of the executive departments,” tying it to the language 
in Article II, Section 2 involving the President’s power to require the 
opinion in writing of the principal officer in each executive department.46 
The legislative history made clear that the “principal officers of the 
executive departments” terminology referred to the heads of the then 10 
executive departments,47 which might grow in the future, as they did to 
15.48 In House floor debates, Congressmen Celler expressed again his 
view that the intended reference was to the heads of the executive 
departments listed in Title V, Section 2 of the US Code.49 
The “immediately decide” language for Congress’s handling of a 
case of disagreement about a President’s inability was changed to 
“immediately proceed to decide the issue” in order to allow time for 
Congress to gather information concerning the disagreement before taking 
a vote.50 The Senate Judiciary Committee opposed a specific time 
limitation for congressional action and also rejected the use of a two-thirds 
vote requirement for action by the heads of the executive departments—
retaining the majority vote provision.51 During the Senate floor debates of 
February 19, 1965, Senator Bayh accepted a suggestion by Senator 
Roman Hruska that there be a seven-day interval for consideration of a 
Presidential declaration of recovery instead of two days, as then contained 
in S.J. 1 and H.J. Res. 1.52 
In the course of the hearings, Senator Bayh and others made clear the 
intent behind S.J. Res. 1 in a number of areas. In the House Judiciary 
Committee hearings held in February 1965, Senator Bayh said, in 
response to a question as to whether the Cabinet loses its ability to 
participate in an inability declaration once Congress creates another body: 
 
 45.  See FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 1, at 86. 
 46.  See id. 
 47.  See id. at 117. 
 48.  See 5 U.S.C. § 101.  
 49.  See 111 CONG. REC. 7944 (1965) (statement of Representative Celler). The legislative 
history contains conflicting statements on whether acting secretaries could participate in an inability 
determination. But the House Judiciary Committee and Senator Robert Kennedy indicated that acting 
secretaries could participate, which I believe is the correct view. See FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH 
AMENDMENT, supra note 1, at 117-18. 
 50.  See FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 1, at 87. 
 51.  See id. at 86-87. 
 52.  Id. at 89. 
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[Yes.] The Congress has a choice of either providing another body or 
permitting the Cabinet to continue to function. This is abundantly clear 
in the language as I read it. If Congress finds that the Cabinet cannot 
adequately fill this role, then it provides an alternative body which will 
function. This is the way we intended it. This is the way most all of us 
look at it and the way I would like it to read in the record.53 
Herbert Brownell, who played a major role in the development of the 
amendment as the Attorney General said, in response to a question of 
whether, if Congress designated another body, unanimity would be 
required, or only a majority: “I think in such a case the Congress could by 
law provide for it either way.”54 The ABA consensus recommendation, in 
my view, did not intend the requirement of a majority of the Cabinet to 
limit the power of Congress in devising rules for another body, as 
Brownell reflected.55 As to the other body, if the Cabinet proved to be 
unworkable for its role, Senate minority leader Everett Dirksen said it 
could consist of ordinary citizens, medical experts, and those who have 
the ability to answer the question regarding inability.56 Congressmen 
Celler said that the “body could be one of experts or expertise needed to 
determine the issue of inability.”57 Senator Bayh offered that the other 
body could consist of five psychiatrists and five members of the House 
and Senate to act with the Vice President in making the determination.58 
Chairman Celler also spoke of the other body possibly consisting of 
physicians or the Supreme Court.59 
As the Senate was considering S.J. Res. 1, the House Judiciary 
Committee was doing the same with its twin, H.R. Res. 1, which resulted 
in the House having significant differences with the language contained 
in S.J. Res. 1 as it passed the Senate on February 19, 1965.60 The changes 
focused on Sections 3 and 4 of the proposed amendment. The House 
committee did not accept the Senate change of a 7-day wait period for 
consideration of a presidential declaration of recovery, preserving the 
two-day time period; nor did it accept a check on the President if he 
 
 53.  Presidential Inability: Hearings Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89 Cong. 93 
(1965). 
 54.  See id. at 254. 
 55.  See id. 
 56.  See 111 CONG. REC. 15,592 (1965). 
 57.  See 111 CONG. REC. 7,965 (1965). 
 58.  See Presidential Inability: Hearings before House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 58 
(1965). 
 59.  See id. at 56. 
 60.  See FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 1, at 299-305 (describing the 
Twenty-fifth Amendment’s evolution). 
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declared his own inability (hence the House language “until he transmits 
a declaration to the contrary”); and it did not accept the “immediately 
proceed to decide” language of S.J. Res. 1, favoring instead a 10-day 
limitation on Congress in considering a disagreement issue. It measured 
the 10 days from the date of receipt by Congress of the disagreement 
declaration from the Vice President and a majority of the principal officers 
(or heads) of the executive departments. It also changed the recipients of 
any declarations to the Speaker and President pro tempore, rather than to 
the President of the Senate. In the case of a disagreement with the 
President, it was reasoned, the Vice President and the heads of executive 
departments should not be transmitting a declaration to the President of 
the Senate, who would be the Vice President himself. The Senate version 
contained no provision for the convening of Congress if not in session 
when a disagreement arose.61 The legislative history indicates that 
declarations of inability and cessation of inability would be effective when 
transmitted, not when received.62 
In the House debates of April 13, 1965, on a suggestion made by 
Speaker McCormack,63 an amendment was adopted to require Congress 
to assemble within 48 hours, if not in session, on receiving a challenge to 
a President’s declaration of recovery.64 Upon passage of the House 
version, with the Speaker’s floor amendment, on April 13, 1965, by a vote 
of 368 to 29,65 it became necessary for a conference committee to be 
established because of the differences between the House and Senate 
proposals. The time limitation of 10 days was central to this impasse.66 
There were also language issues to be resolved. Among these issues was 
from when to measure the time period if Congress was out of session. H.J. 
Res. 1 measured it from the date when the Vice President and principal 
officers sent their declaration of inability to the Speaker and President pro 
tempore. S.J. Res. 1 measured the time from when Congress assembled. 
On June 23, 1965, the 10-member conference of the two Houses met 
to resolve their differences and reached a unanimous agreement. For the 
most part the changes reflected in the House proposed amendment were 
accepted.67 Thus, the transmittal of declarations would be to the President 
pro tempore and Speaker, and there would be no check on the President 
 
 61.  See id. 
 62.  See FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 1, at 113. 
 63.  See Feerick, Personal Remembrance, supra note 1, at 1097. 
 64.  111 CONG. REC. 7,966 (1965). 
 65.  Id. at 7,968-69. 
 66.  FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 1, at 100. 
 67.  See id. at 100-01. 
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resuming his powers and duties upon his declaration of recovery in the 
case of a voluntary declaration of inability. The House provision for the 
convening of Congress, if out of session, was also agreed to. The period 
for consideration by the Vice President and a majority68 of the heads of 
the executive departments of a President’s recovery declaration was 
compromised at four days instead of two or seven in their respective 
versions. After a difficult period of negotiations, the Senate accepted a 21-
day limitation on deciding a disagreement issue, measuring it, if out of 
session, from when Congress assembled. It changed the expression in the 
House amendment to S.J. Res. 1 of “Whenever the Vice President and a 
majority of the principal officers of the executive departments, or such 
other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit. . .” to: “The Vice 
President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive 
departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide. . .”69 
According to Senator Bayh, there was no discussion of the 
“either/or” disjunctive expression in the committee.70 I later learned that 
the expression came from Senator Roman Hruska of Nebraska who 
wanted to make sure that the Vice President could not be removed if 
Congress created another body under Section 4. 
Upon seeing this report, I noted the expression “either/or” and called 
attention to a possible ambiguity enabling two bodies to exist at the same 
time. I discuss my involvement with this issue, including research I did 
for Senator Bayh’s staff, in a Fordham Law Review article.71 The House 
accepted the report by voice vote on June 30,72 while the Senate debated 
it on both June 30 and July 6, 1965, and then, by a vote of 68 to 5, accepted 
it but not until after a heated debate on the meaning of the either/or 
expression.73 
 
 68.  Whether the “majority” vote requirement of Section 4 was intended as a limitation on 
Congress in establishing another body has a checkered history. The provision was taken from the 
ABA consensus which reflected what Herbert Brownell said in his testimony before the House 
Judiciary Committee, as to unanimity if Congress decided, because of the unworkability of the 
Cabinet, on another method. The House proposal placed commas before and after the other body 
provision, which would be supportive of this interpretation by Brownell, as would the language of the 
conference committee report as presented by the House Conferees. However, the introduction of 
“either/or” and the absence of a comma before the other body provision in the Amendment itself puts 
this view in question. See H.R. Rep. No. 89-564 (1965). See also YALE LAW SCHOOL RULE OF LAW 
CLINIC, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: A READER’S 
GUIDE 16-17 (2018). 
 69.  See H.R. REP. NO. 89-564 at 2 (1965). 
 70.  See 111 CONG. REC. 15,594 (1965). 
 71.  See BAYH, ONE HEARTBEAT AWAY, supra note 27, at 68-69; Feerick, Personal 
Remembrance, supra note 1. 
 72.  See 111 CONG. REC. 15,212-13 (1965). 
 73.  See 111 CONG. REC. 15,585, 87 (1965). 
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At the very last moment, I noted the absence of an “s” on the second 
use of “executive departments” in Section 4 of the amendment and 
immediately called the committee’s staff to pass on this omission and was 
told that it was too late inasmuch as the amendment was on its way to the 
state legislatures for ratification. I can’t describe my sadness in 
discovering the missing “s” but felt assured that the use of the singular 
would not be an issue in the future because the legislative history was so 
abundant concerning the use of the plural, namely, the heads of the 
executive departments and then the “principal officers of the executive 
departments.”74 
Conspicuously absent from the proposed amendment was an answer 
to John Dickinson’s question, “What is the extent of the term disability.” 
At no point in the 10-year history of the amendment did any of the 
proposals contain a definition of the term. This was not due to oversight. 
As to the absence of a definition, Eisenhower said in his memorandum of 
March 1958 that “it would be difficult to write any law or an Amendment 
in such a fashion as to take care of every contingency that might possibly 
occur.”75 He added: “While the great area of uncertainty now existing 
could and should be drastically reduced, I am not sure that even the most 
carefully devised plan, objectively arrived at, could remove doubt in every 
instance.”76 
In his memorandum, President Eisenhower said that an inability 
could occur by “disease or accident that would prevent the President from 
making important decisions.”77 Another form, he said, “could come about 
through a failure of communication between the President and Capital at 
any time he might be absent therefrom” or “uncertainty about the 
whereabouts of the President occasioned by a forced landing of the 
Presidential airplane.”78 He also made reference to a disability in his case, 
as determined and judged by distinguished medical authorities as being 
permanent in nature, stating that in such circumstances he would 
 
 74.  See 111 CONG. REC. 7,938 (1965); Hearings Before House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th 
Cong. 40 (1965). 
 75.  Fordham Clinic Report, supra note 17, at 77. 
 76.  Id. President Eisenhower said “we decided and this was the thing that frightened me: 
suppose something happens to you in the turn of a stroke that might incapacitate you mentally and 
you wouldn’t know it, and the people around you, wanting to protect you, would probably keep this 
away from the public. So I decided that what we must do is make the Vice President decide when the 
President can no longer carry on, and then he should take over the duties, and when the President 
became convinced that he could take back his duties, he would be the one to decide.” CBS Reports: 
The Crisis of President Succession (CBS television broadcast Jan. 1964). 
 77.  Fordham Clinic Report, supra note 17, at 77. 
 78.  Id. 
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“promptly resign” his position as President.79 In the Congressional 
debates of 1965, the principal authors of the amendment spoke of physical 
and mental causes, temporary and permanent, as constituting an inability 
where the President had become unable to discharge his powers and 
duties.80 
The amendment went forward to the states with issues arising from 
time to time about what was intended by the expression “inability”81 and 
also in a few states about the wisdom of Section 2, for filling a vacancy in 
the Vice Presidency.82 The amendment process was not without other 
surprises, such as which state was the first to ratify and which state put it 
into the Constitution on February 10, 1967, as two states ratified it on that 
day, Minnesota and Nevada.83 The amendment’s ratification was 
followed by a glorious event in the White House on February 23, 1967, 
sponsored by President Johnson who wanted to celebrate, by 
proclamation, it having become part of the Constitution. On February 10, 
2017, the amendment celebrated its 50th anniversary, having established 




 79.  Id. at 78. 
 80.  See 111 CONG. REC. 7,194 (1965) (Congressman Richard Poff explaining situations where 
Section 4 applies); id. at 3283 (Senator Bayh stating Section 4 applies to “a President who is unable 
to perform the powers and duties of his office” and not merely an unpopular President.). 
 81.  See FEERICK, TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 1, at 106 (describing debates in 
Colorado Legislature over ratification of 25th Amendment). 
 82.  Id.  
 83.  Id. at 107. 
 84.  See John D. Feerick, Dedication to Senator Birch E. Bayh, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 907 
(2017); Goldstein, Taking From the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, supra note 12, at 965-980. 
